Kurdish history

Part 1 (Whereas my other histories on this site are based on the writings of a wide variety of experts, this is based primarily on the contents of one particular volume, A Modern History of the Kurds by David McDowal which, it is worth bearing in mind, is freely available in Istanbul shops).

The Kurdish people are ethnically and linguistically akin to Iranians. They number between 24 and 27 million worldwide, with about half in Turkey, a quarter in Iran and a sixth in Iraq - the majority living in the mountainous regions around the common border of these three nations, the ethnographic 'Kurdistan.' A further one million are in Syria, many of them having migrated down from Anatolia.

Three quarters of Kurds are Sunni Muslims. The remainder, mostly in central Anatolia, are Alevi, a branch of the Shi'ite faith with influences from the Zoroastrian and Turkic Shaman religions dating back 3,500 years. Many belong to Sufi mystic brotherhoods, another pre-Islamic tie.

Their languages form a branch of the Indo-European Farsi family, but differ from one another in some cases as much as English and German do. Turkic and Arabic influences are evident, and there are also many distinct 'Kurdish' words. Some Kurdish dialects have more in common with Farsi than they do with other Kurdish dialects.

The Kurds are considered to have originated in and around Iran. Waves of these Indo-European tribes began migrating westward in the Second Million BC. Indo-Europeans linguistically; ethnically, like most peoples of Southern Asia, a hybrid of Australoid (who originated in South East Asia) and Caucasoid (who originated in Southern Russia).

Kurdish tribes, in fact, were on the receiving end of attacks from Sumer (Iraq) over 4,000 years ago. But little is really known of their history until the advent of Islam in the seventh century. The ninth century found them fighting alongside the (doomed) Sassanians of Persia, and they were soon absorbed into the Islamic Empire.

They frequently rebelled against their Arab rulers however, and in 866 actually captured the city of Mosul. At the same time, Kurds remained prominent in the Arab campaigns against Christian Byzantium, Armenia and the Crusades. Though they often grated with the Turkmen alongside whom they fought, they produced similarly fine officers, notably the great Saladin al-Din of Tikrit (Northern Iraq). Saladin routed the Crusades in the 12th century and founded the Ayyubid Dynasty which spanned Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Mecca and Diyarbakir (southern Turkey).

Saladin's rise coincided with the beginning of Arabic demise, and the Kurds now found themselves on the receiving end of Mongol and Turkish Seljuk raids, especially in Anatolia - where the entire population of Diyarbakir (Kurdistan's biggest city) was wiped out by one Mongol rampage.

Diyarbakir and other Kurdish settlements were sacked again by Tamerlane the Tartar in the 14th century, and there were further invasions in the 15th century. These edited highlights give a distorted overall picture, however. For the most part, Kurds were able to live a peaceful, pastoral existence.

A major turning point came early in the 16th century when the Ottoman Empire, approaching its zenith, defeated the Persian Safavids at the Battle of Chaldiran. Subsequent Alevi uprisings were put down by the Turks, in one instance leaving 40,000 dead. The Ottomans followed up with the capture of Tabriz.

This left Kurdistan as a virtual 'no-man's land' between the two empires. Henceforth, the Kurds were to come increasingly under the influence of the Turks. Many chose to defect to the Ottoman Empire of their own accord. Suleyman the Magnificent proceeded to take further Kurdish-occupied areas from the Persians, with 40,000 Kurdish fighters assisting in the capture of Baghdad in 1638. (On the other side of the border, the Kurdish Ardalan tribe were fighting for the Shah...).

The Baban Kurds, meanwhile, found themselves fighting on both sides in the Ottoman-Persian wars of the late eighteenth century. They were not mere tools of the empire, but proved well adept at playing the two off against each other.

At the beginning of the 19th century, Kurdistan itself had become the cause of conflict between the Sultan and the Shah. By then a new power had joined the fray; Russia with its designs on the Ottoman Empire, now in decline. Many Kurds joined the ranks of the Russians. Nomadic Kurdish bandits, meanwhile, had become the bane of Anatolia.

In the 1830s Mir Muhammad of Rawanduz ruthlessly hacked out a Kurdish Empire in Iraq and began to threaten Ottoman interests. The Turks, preoccupied with the Egyptian challenge on Syria, sought to appease him, even offering to make him Pasha of all Kurdistan. But Mir Muhammad marched right up the Tigris to the Anatolian frontier, at which point he was only forced to withdraw in order to quell a rebellion within his own domains. The Ottomans pursued him and he finally submitted in 1834, having been assured safe passage to Istanbul (he later disappeared without a trace).

The Egyptians, meanwhile, had routed the Ottomans, allowing the Kurdish tribe of Bader Khan of Buhtan to fill the void. After failing in his campaign against the Assyrians, he turned on the Nestorian Christians, committing two massacres. The initial Ottoman attack in response was repelled, but they returned two years later with a larger force and forced Bader Khan to surrender. He was exiled to the island of Crete.

The latter half of the century witnessed the rise of the Sufi Shaykhs within the Ottoman Empire. In 1880 Shaykh Ubaydallah of Nihri invaded Persia on behalf of the 'Kurdish Nation.' This began with a rebellion within Iran itself led by his son Abd al Qadir. The rebels advanced eastward with an army of 20,000, slaughtering 2,000 civilians at Miandoab and destroying some 2,000 villages along their way.

But before long most of the tribesmen in their ranks had returned to their homes, laden with booty, leaving a mere 1,500 to face the wrath of the Persian army, 12,000-strong. The Shaykh's remaining forces fled, many to be captured and killed. Ubaydallah was sent into exile and died in 1883.

The 19th century closed with the massacres of Armenian Christians throughout the Ottoman Empire, triggered by an aborted hostage-taking incident in Istanbul which had given Sultan Abd al Hamid a pretext to stoke fanaticism in order to secure his own status. The Hamidiya Cavalry, a regiment formed by the Sultan himself, were prominent among the Kurds who participated in the atrocities. Internationally the very word 'Kurd' had become synonymous with 'banditry.'

The Sultan's insistence on all-encompassing Ottoman nationality only strengthened the Kurdish quest for autonomy within the empire. In 1889 two Kurds were among the four founding members of the Committee for Union Progress (CUP), an organisation with similar objectives to the Young Turks.

The Kurdish duo were exiled to Tripoli in 1895 and escaped to Europe two years later. Abdallah Jadwat then wrote for Kurdistan, a European-based publication which also championed Armenian demands.

Meanwhile the Nihri, successors of Ubayd Allah, had formed an autonomous movement, also in exile, and a group of Kurdish youth instigated the Kurdish Hope Society, publishing the Rujd Kurd newspaper which enjoyed wide membership.

The Young Turk revolution in 1908, overthrowing Abd al Hamid, was cause for much celebration among the Kurdish community. Among other things, it brought an end to the age-old 'agha' system, which entailed village chiefs living as virtual princes within their domains, oppressing and exploiting their subjects at will.

However, some of the more extreme religious elements of Kurdish society, and withal the aghas themselves, were less pleased, and began to liaise with the Russians with a view to establishing an independent homeland for the Kurds in eastern Anatolia. The new Turkish government subsequently laid off the aghas, and a united Russian-Kurdish-Armenian front never did materialise.

During the First World War, Kurdistan became a battle ground. Russian-backed Armenians and Turkish-backed Kurds committed massacres against each another. Kurdish tribesmen were also enlisted to participate in the massacres of 1915, which some have termed the 'Armenian genocide.' Others, however, notably Alevi, offered shelter to the Armenian Christians.

The Kurds reward for assisting the Turkish army was, ironically, forced assimilation under the Young Turk government. This included a programme of dispersal, uprooting 700,000 Kurds from their villages, with as many as half of them perishing.

In all the depredations of war hit the Kurds particularly hard. Perhaps half a million died, many from cold and starvation, and this does not include the estimated 800,000 killed in battle.

The post-war Sykes-Picot Plot, a secret agreement between the governments of England and France (exposed by the Bolsheviks) involving the virtual partition of Turkey, threatened to leave Kurds scattered among a variety of European colonies. Kurdish designs on autonomy were therefore put on the backburner, as Islamic solidarity with the Turks became paramount.

The surprising Turkish victory led to the formation of the Turkish Republic within the borders we know today. The Kurds pushed their case at the Treaty of Luasanne (1923), but their pleas for autonomy fell on deaf ears.

Harsh reprisals followed a rebellion by Shaykh Said and his followers in 1924, including the repression of all forms of Kurdish nationalism. Between 1924 and 1938 all but one of the 18 military operations involving the Turkish army were carried out in Kurdistan. Kurdish sources claimed 200,000 died under 'deportation' from the region, with a further 15,000 villagers massacred.

In the late 20s the conflict moved to Mt Ararat, where the Kurds proclaimed a republic. This threatened to draw Turkey into war with Iran as the rebels sought refuge on the latter's side of the border. The Turks eventually drove the rebels off the mountain, with widespread executions in the aftermath.

Meanwhile in Iraq, Kurdish aims were scuppered by British, American and Turkish interest in the oil within the region. Sulaymaniya, in east Iraq, had gained a degree of self-rule under British rule. But their leader Shaykh Mahmud tried to seized full control and was sent into exile.

Pardoned and reinstated by the British in 1922, as a bulwark against the Turks, history repeated itself, as Mahmud again began to conspire against the colonial rulers. The British consequently bombed Sulaymaniya a number of times, forcing Mahmud to flee to the safety of the mountains. Riots followed in Sulaymaniya in 1930, leading to civilian deaths.

Indeed, at the signing of Iraqi independence in 1931, all promises to the Kurds in terms of political and cultural rights were forgotten. The League of Nations' acceptance of Iraq a year later was a further slap in the face of the Kurds.

The Barzan tribe, led by Shaykh Ahmad, proclaimed self-rule in 1932 and twice defeated the Iraqi forces. But the Iraqi's returned a third time, with the aid of British air support. The latter, using delayed action bombs in violation of the Hague Convention, caused widespread civilian carnage, and Ahmad was forced to surrender. His brothers continued the rebellion for another year, before surrendering under a generous amnesty.

A separate uprising on the part of the Khalil Khushawi Kurds, continued until 1936.

Back to Turkey where a Kurdish rebellion in the Anatolian province of Dersim had been quashed by aerial bombing in 1935. Casualties were estimated as high as 40,000 and comparisons were drawn to the treatment of Armenians two decades earlier. At that time Kurds accounted for 70% of East Anatolia's population.

In 1937 Turkey, Iraq and Iran signed a pact which reognised the established borders. No consideration was given to the Kurds.

In Iran as well there had been a series of post-World War I revolts, notably that of the Abdui Shikak. Backed by the Soviets, they remained the scourge of Iran until 1928, when the government betrayed and murdered their leader Simqu.

After the Second World War there was an uprising in Mahobad, also Soviet-backed. Following much turbulence, political scheming, inter-tribal conflict and warfare, this culminated in the formation of a tiny Kurdish Republic in 1945. Mahobad principal Qazi Muhammad, founder of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran, was declared president.

But when the Soviets withdrew from Iran just one year later, the republic was left vulnerable. Inevitably there were skirmishes, providing Tehran with a pretext to send in the troops. Qazi Muhammad and others, including his brother and his cousin, were publicly hanged.

Following the 1958 coup in Iraq by General Abd al Karim Qasim, a Kurdish rebellion broke out (Kurds actually fought on both sides, against Qasim and for him). When Qasim was on his way out, the Kurds allied themselves with the Baath Party, who overthrew him in 1963.

But the Kurds were betrayed in subsequent negotiations, with the oil-rich region of Kirkuk proving an insurmountable obstacle. The Iraq army imposed martial law in Sulaymaniya, with many deaths and disappearances resulting.

The Kurds had been weakened by a division within their own ranks. Mulla Mustafa's rebels had driven the Kurdish Democratic Party across the border into Iran. But he permitted them back again when war resumed with Baghdad in the mid-60s. Fifteen thousand Kurds held out against a hundred thousand Iraqis, before president Abdul Salam Arif's death in a plane crash brought a temporary pause to the conflict.

Arif's brother Abdul Rahman took over and resumed the war. But not even the use of napalm and chemical weapons by his airforce could bring him victory, and his army stumbled to defeat at the hands of the Kurdish Peshmergas, losing hundreds.

Iraq prime minister Abdul Rahman al-Bazzaz signed a treaty so generous to Kurdish interests, including a 'map to autonomy,' that he was driven out of office by Rahman and the army.

In the early 70s the Baaths, with a young Saddam Husayn prominent, again promised the Kurds autonomy, including full national rights, only for negotiations to again founder. The Baaths then attempted to assassinate Mulla Mustafa, sending human bombs.

Mustafa survived this and, emboldened by promises of US support, declined all Baath conditions, leading to outright war in the mid-70s. Iraq's army was twice the size of the Kurds', and backed up by tanks and aircraft. But Iran backed the Kurds with a view to overthrowing the Baaths. The ensuing stalemate led to a truce in March 1975. This signalled the end of Mustafa's involvement in the Kurdish struggle.

Meanwhile in Iran, the collapse of the Pahlavi regime in the late 70s, brought about a new push for Kurdish autonomy there. Tehran viewed this as 'secession,' all negotiations failed, and an estimated 10,000 deaths resulted from clashes during the first two years of the Khomeini reign.

A further 200 Kurds died in clashes with the Azaris when they attempted to stage a rally in Naqada in 1979.

The following year the Iranian army launched a major assault on Kurdish regions, subduing the locals, though at major cost to themselves.

At the outset of the Iran-Iraq War, Kurds seized lands within Iran. By 1983, however, Tehran had reclaimed it all and the rebels were driven across the border into Iraq.

As Iran gained the upper hand in the war with Iraq, Saddam Huseyn, unable to negotiate assistance from the Kurds, and fearful they would assist the enemy, executed 8,000 young men of the Barzani tribe. By 1986, Iraqi Kurds were fighting for Iran, and in 1987 they captured the Dukan Valley.

Further atrocities against Kurdish civilians ensued, including arbitrary executions and the razing of villages. Receiving technnological assistance from the US, Iraq employed further use of chemical bombs. This intensified as Iran consolidated its advantage in the war, and Iraq was accused of genocide of Kurds with its use of concentration camps and mass graves .

By mid-1989 over half of Iraqi Kurdistan had been cleared of Kurds. Yet, despite irrefutable evidence of crimes against humanity, the international community failed to react, with the industrialized nations continuing to back Baghdad against Tehran. They were also eyeing the $50,000 million worth of reconstruction projects Iraq put out to tender as the war ground to its conclusion. Britain doubled its export credit facility to Iraq, while the US and various European nations continued to supply sensitive arms and equipment.

Neither did things improve for the Kurds in Iran at the conclusion of the war in 1988, nor even with Khomeini's death the following year. Indeed, a number of top Kurdish politicians were assassinated during this period.

Saddam's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 brought about a whole new chapter in Kurdish history in Iraq. Encouraged by American president George Bush (Sr), the Kurds rose up in rebellion. Iraq responded with massacres and further use of chemical warfare. The US stayed out of it, reluctant to alarm its allies Turkey and Saudi Arabia by being seen to support Kurds or Shi'is.

Turkey initially denied access to Kurdish refugees from Iraq. Iran, on the other hand, opened its border.

The Coalition belatedly imposed a safe-haven for Kurds in the north of Iraq, and neither the subsequent skirmishes with Saddam's troops nor economic pressure could prevent Kurdish autonomous elections going ahead.

Barzani and Talabani, leaders of the two main political groups, were appointed joint leaders of the autonomous government. The latter, acting unilaterally, then invited Turkey to annex the oil-rich region of 4 million inhabitants. Ankara, fighting its own war with Kurdish (PKK) rebels, declined, although it later provided some economic aid.

Skirmishes broke out between Barzani's followers and those of Talabani in 1993, with Iranian involvement, and continued into 1994.

Meanwhile in Iran, the situation finally began to improve for Kurds with the election of Islamic reformer Mohammad Khatami in 1997, notwithstanding a brutal response to protests over the capture of Abdullah Ocalan a year later.

Ocalan was the leader of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), which had turned to terrorist activity in Turkey in the early 1980s. Turkey appears to be winning the battle with the PKK, but the struggle is costing the nation US$10 billion a year and adversely effecting its EU bid and tourism industry.






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